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Productivity gains from offshoring: an empirical analysis for 
the Netherlands 
 
Frank A.G. den Butter and Christiaan Pattipeilohy 
 
1. Introduction 
Globalization and the ICT-revolution made physical distance and international borders less 
important in trade transactions. However, the volume of trade is still relatively small as 
compared to what the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theorem on international trade would 
predict. Trefler (1995) shows that the neoclassical paradigm on international trade performs 
poorly in explaining actual observed levels of international trade. Several studies point to the 
relevance of transaction costs with respect to this ‘missing trade’ (see for example Eaton and 
Kortum, 2002). Transaction costs are all costs incurred when making a transaction and go far 
beyond costs associated with the transaction which are directly measurable such as 
transportation costs, taxes and duties.. These costs include finding a suitable transaction 
partner, specifying the transaction, the costs of actually conducting the transaction and the 
costs of sustaining a transaction. They are influenced by search costs, cultural and linguistic 
aspects, the institutional environment, opportunistic behaviour, among many other things. All 
these factors make transactions costly, thereby reducing the profitability of transactions. 
Reducing transaction costs increases the scope for profitable and value-creating trade. In fact, 
transaction costs represent the fictions in trade transactions and set a limit to (international) 
specialisation Lowering transaction costs thus enhances the scope for specialization, which, 
as already stressed by Adam Smith in his famous example of the pin factory, creates value 
for society as a whole. 
 
Part of the globalization debate focuses on moving abroad production facilities to countries 
which are relatively abundantly endowed with cheap labour, e.g. the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China). Recently however, there is some evidence that not only low-skilled 
labour is being moved from advanced to developing countries, but also high-skilled (white-
collar) labour.  This has renewed the interest of OECD-countries to specify the sectors in 
which they have a comparative advantage, and in what kind of economic activities they will 
have to specialize. An example is the Lisbon Strategy in which members of the European 
Union have explicitly set the target to become ‘the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the year 2010.’ 
 
Following David Ricardo’s notion of comparative advantages, economists stress the 
unambiguous gains from international trade. Public opinion however, does not seem to 
support that economist’s view. An example is Gregory Mankiw, who, as chairman of the 
council of economic advisors, had pointed out that moving production overseas was just 
another way for the American economy to benefit from international trade. Mankiw’s 
argument was economically sound, but politically unheard-of so that he really had a hard 
time defending that opinion during the 2004 American presidential elections (Mankiw and 
Swagel, 2005; Blinder, 2006).  
 
This paper provides a follow up to a (small) part of that debate. Reduction of transaction 
costs through ICT and better transportation technology increased the scope for specialization. 
Moving fragments in the value chain abroad has become a more and more suitable strategy to 
exploit factor cost differentials and to increase competitiveness. The paper tries to assess the 
gains from this development by estimating the effects of offshoring on total factor 
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productivity in the Netherlands. Our empirical model is based on concepts from modern 
theory of international trade and from transaction costs economics, and is especially inspired 
by the modelling of trade in tasks by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, 2006b). The 
contents of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of relevant theoretical 
concepts, including the trade in tasks, for our empirical analysis. Section 3 reviews the 
literature on international specialization and fragmentation of the value chain, and the 
empirical evidence of the effect of these aspects of globalization on productivity. In section 4 
we specify our empirical model and discuss its estimation results. Ample attention is paid to 
the construction of an indicator for vertical specialization at the macro level. Finally section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Offshoring, transaction costs and trade in tasks 
 
2.1 Transaction cost economics 
As mentioned above, transaction costs play a major role in the decision to split up the 
production chain and to outsource parts of that chain. Ronald Coase (1937) introduced the 
transaction costs as ‘the costs of using the price mechanism in the market’ This concept was 
elaborated by Oliver Williamson, who defined transaction costs as the costs of running the 
economic system (see e.g. Williamson 1975; following Arrow, 1969). Nowadays the term 
transaction costs is used to describe all the costs incurred in setting up, making, and 
maintaining a transaction. Cheung (1987) describes transaction costs as all costs that are not 
conceivable in the so called ‘Robinson-Crusoe economy’. North and Wallis (1994) 
distinguish between transformation costs and transaction costs. Transformation costs are 
incurred when the physical attributes of a good or service are changed. Transaction costs, on 
the other hand, are incurred when the property rights on a good or service change. Therefore 
transaction costs defy the existence of a frictionless economy: the neoclassical paradigm is 
only valid when there are zero transaction costs (North, 1991). Positive transaction costs 
influence allocation decisions by reducing the profitability of transactions. Some transaction 
which would otherwise be utility increasing may not occur when transaction costs exist. 
  
What are the sources of these transaction costs? Williamson (1985) argues that transaction 
costs exist because of three phenomena: bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and 
asset specificity. Bounded rationality is based on two principles: informational complexities 
and informational uncertainty (Dietrich, 1994). Informational complexity refers to the fact 
that individuals have limited abilities to process all information that is available. Hence an 
individual is unable to process all relevant aspects of a transaction. Informational uncertainty 
on the other hand refers to the fact that it is impossible to perfectly foresee all future states of 
the world. Individuals engaged in a transaction can not perfectly foresee all contingencies 
involved in a transaction and therefore suffer from incomplete information (Tirole, 1988). 
When individuals are not globally rational, but behave according to bounded rationality, it is 
impossible to specify complete contracts without costs. Hence bounded rationality may lead 
to transaction costs. However, it is not a sufficient condition for such costs to occur.  
 
Opportunistic behaviour refers to the ‘self-interest seeking behaviour’ of individuals 
(Williamson, 1985). Without opportunistic behaviour it would not be necessary to fully 
specify complete contracts. Therefore, the transaction costs which would arise through 
bounded rationality do not exist per se, in case individuals do not want to gain advantage 
over the loss of another individual. However, when individuals exhibit opportunistic 
behaviour the opposite is true. Individuals may use the incompleteness in contracts, which 
exist through bounded rationality, to their own gain. This opens up opportunities for strategic 
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behaviour, and executive hazards. This in its turn causes the necessity for trading partners to 
monitor each other, and to enforce contracts legally. 
  
Asset specificity is defined as the extent to which an investment supporting a transaction has 
more value in that specific transaction, than in any other purpose (McGuinness, 1994). Asset 
specificity determines the scope of the continuing interest of both contracting parties in each 
other (Williamson, 1985). When there is no asset specificity, markets are perfectly 
contestable, and individuals will not want to invest in continuing economic relationships 
(Dietrich, 1994).  
  
Obviously, given the great variety and tine dimensional aspects of transaction costs, it is 
difficult to give an operational definition of this concept and quantify the transactions costs 
associated with trade. Of course, it is possible to calculate monetary values for transportation 
costs, contracting costs, legal fees etcetera. The measurement problem occurs with the more 
informal types of transaction costs, which relate for instance to trust, and institutional and 
cultural differences. In spite of these problems of definition and measurement some attempts 
have been made to estimate the size of transaction costs at the macro-level. Following the 
methodology of North and Wallis (1986), De Vor (1994) asserted that in 1990 total 
transaction costs in the Netherlands economy amounted to almost 53% of GNP. It implies 
that more than half of value added in production in the Netherlands relates to conducting 
transactions. In the period 1960-1990 total transaction costs increased with about 9 %-points. 
This can be ascribed completely to an increase in the private sector. According to De Vor’s 
measurement transaction costs in the private sector are (in 1990) over 5 times higher than in 
the public sector. Van Dalen and Van Vuuren (2005) measure by means of occupational data 
that in the Netherlands approximately 25% of workers is employed in transaction jobs, and 
29% if one includes transport tasks. However, these occupational data do not take into 
account time spent on coordination by production workers. Klamer and McCloskey (1995) 
note that one quarter of the GDP is related to persuasion, i.e. talks to make “real production” 
possible.  
 
In their survey on “trade costs”, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) illustrate the size of 
these trade costs by means of the tax equivalent of these costs: what would be the tax tariff 
on direct production costs if all trade costs where regarded as taxes – from a theoretical point 
of view trade costs have the same distortional effects on production as taxes. Anderson and 
Van Wincoop have a rather broad definition of trade costs so that it comprises most of the 
transaction costs discussed earlier in this section. Their main finding is that trade costs are 
large and variable. The example of the Barby doll, as discussed in Feenstra (1998), illustrates 
these large costs. The direct production costs of the doll are $1, but they are sold in the US 
for about 10$. So the costs of transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing have an ad 
valorem tax equivalent of  900%. In their own (rough) calculations Anderson and Van 
Wincoop arrive at an estimate of the tax equivalent of “representative” trade costs for 
industrialized countries of 170%. The number breaks down as follows: 21% transportation 
costs, 44% border related trade barriers and 55% retail and wholesale distribution costs (2.7 = 
1.21*1.44*1.55). Anderson and Van Wincoop argue that further evidence on the importance 
of trade costs should be obtained by using microeconomic founded gravity equations.   
These models, inspired by Newton’s equation of gravity in physics, relate the size of trade 
flows to GDP (analogue to mass in physics) and distance (De Groot et al, 2004). Including 
other variables in this model, which proxy (part of) transaction costs can give results on to 
what extent transaction costs influence international trade. Nowadays there is a rich literature 
on the effects of informal trade barriers on the level of trade, which stress the importance of 
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transaction costs in international trade (see e.g. McCallum, 1995 or Helliwell, 1998)). For 
example, Den Butter and Mosch (2003) estimate a gravity equation to assess the effects of 
trust on trade flows and distinguish between formal and informal trust. It appears that an 
increase in both formal as informal trust reduces transaction costs and thus trade barriers and 
hence increases trade. Another example is De Groot et al (2004) who found that similar 
institutions in countries, and better institutions, enhance trade by reducing transaction costs.  
 
2.2 Relevant concepts in globalization 
Transaction costs reduction through ICT and economic reforms in some developing countries 
have opened up profitable business opportunities abroad. Firms can benefit from this trend of 
globalization in two ways, namely (i) exploitation of factor costs differentials and (ii) 
enlargement of sales areas (Gorter et al, 2005). In the former case firms try to lower their 
costs by reducing factor costs, hence increasing profits and/or competitiveness. In the latter 
case firms make the trade-off between economies of scale, which occur when all production 
facilities are located domestically, and gains from proximity to their sales area. Moving 
activities abroad reduces economies of scale, but also reduces costs of transportation, when 
firms will locate near sales areas. Advancements in ICT have reduced coordination costs 
significantly and hence reduced the importance of scale economies through physical 
proximity. Therefore, the reduction of transaction costs may either lead to a vertical or a 
horizontal split-up of the production chain.  
 
These strategic decisions to move part of the production abroad can also be described as the 
“make or buy” and the location decision. These decisions bring about four possibilities 
indicated in table 1. Following Gorter et al (2005),te table provides a taxonomy which 
distinguishes between offshoring and outsourcing. Both terms are somewhat confusingly 
used to describe the general phenomenon of moving (parts of the) production abroad in this 
era of globalization. In the definition of table 1 offshoring relates to direct foreign 
investments (DFI). As mentioned above, these can be of a vertical and of a horizontal nature. 
 
Table 1: Terminology in Production Fragmentation 
 
 Domestic Abroad 
Within firm Own 
production 
Offshoring 
Outside firm Outsourcing Offshore 
outsourcing 
 
Closely connected to the “make or buy” and the location decision is the question about what 
tasks the firms will actually move abroad.  Markusen and Strand (2007) argue that this is not 
only a question of skill-intensity, i.e. low skill tasks will be moved offshore to low wage 
countries, but also of many other characteristics like routinization, codifiability and the need 
for face-to-face contact. In this vein, Levy and Murnane (2004) argue that more routine parts 
of the production process can be moved offshore more easily, because there may arise fewer 
misunderstandings about relevant information. Leamer and Storper (2001) introduce 
codifiability of information as an important determinant for offshoring or outsourcing tasks. 
They distinguish between codifiable information and tacit knowledge. Codifiable information 
is information which can be computerized and fully documented, and hence can easily be 
exchanged over a large distance. For the exchange of tacit knowledge on the other hand, 
individuals would have to know each other (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a). Tasks 
using relatively more codifiable information are therefore more suited to move offshore than 
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tasks using relatively more tacit knowledge. Blinder (2006) includes the need for 
geographical proximity as a determinant for the appropriateness of a task being offshored. 
For example, a task which needs regular direct face-to-face contact is relatively difficult to 
offshore.  
 
2.3  Transaction costs and offshoring 
Obviously transaction costs are a major determinant of the extent to which moving 
production abroad can be profitable. A reduction of transaction costs will most probably lead 
to an increase in the scale and scope of offshoring.and outsourcing. Empirical research 
confirms this hypothesis. Hummels et al (1999) find that from 1972 until 1990 there has been 
a significant increase in the international vertical specialization of the production process, i.e. 
a rise in offshoring, for almost al OECD countries (excluding Japan). These authors argue 
that only a minor reduction in formal and informal trade barriers increases the profitability of 
utilizing international factor cost differentials considerably. Chen and Chang (2006) repeat 
this exercise for Taiwan and Korea and find a similar conclusion for these two countries. 
Feenstra (1998) remarks that reductions in transportation and communication costs in recent 
years have led to a faster integration of the global economy, while on the other hand fostering 
a disintegration of the production process.  
 
These characteristics of today’s globalization also raises the need for a paradigm shift in the 
theory of international trade. (see for example Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg; 2006a 2006b 
and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2006). The argument is that many tasks, which were non-
tradable yesterday, have become tradable today. In the days of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo, communication between Britain and Portugal was as fast as the trading of goods 
itself. Production could very well be specialized within a production facility but it still 
required physical proximity. This has become less and less true in international trade.  
 
2.4  Trade in tasks 
From that perspective Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, 2006b) present a model for 
the determinants of international trade, which makes an explicit distinction between trade in 
goods (which is the standard approach to modelling international trade) and trade in tasks. 
Here production involves conducting a continuum of ‘tasks’. Different economies are now 
not trading in finished goods, but it are these tasks, or sub-sets of the production process, 
which are tradable. Some tasks may require high-skilled labour input, while other tasks 
require low-skilled labour or even another factor inputs like capital or different categories of 
labour.    
 
Tasks can be performed abroad when it is less costly for a firm to perform a task offshore 
than domestically. Off shoring tasks incurs transaction costs. The crucial assumption is that 
some tasks are moved abroad more easily than others. It implies that moving some tasks 
abroad may incur more transaction costs than other tasks. So when will firms choose to move 
tasks abroad? This will only be the case when the joint costs of foreign factor input and 
transaction costs are less than the domestic costs of factor input. Hence in this framework, 
some tasks will still be performed at home, while others can be performed abroad.  
 
What are implications of this distinction in trade in goods and trade in tasks, which are 
relevant to our empirical analysis? Let us, for the sake of expositional purposes, assume that 
only low-skilled tasks can be moved abroad. By lowering transaction costs it becomes 
profitable to move more low-skill tasks abroad. Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg distinguish 
three effects of the reduction in transaction costs; (i) a productivity effect; (ii) a relative-price 
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effect and (iii) a labour-supply effect. The productivity effect occurs through a decline in the 
costs of tasks being moved abroad. Firms incur lower costs, since more tasks can be 
performed offshore less costly, which drives up the demand for domestic factor inputs, hence 
increasing the return to domestic factors. The relative-price effect occurs through a change in 
the terms of trade of a country. This effect is likely to influence the return on low-skilled 
labour adversely. An improvement in the terms of trade, defined by the price of exports in 
terms of imports, will put downward pressure on low-skill wage since the exporting, high-
skill industry becomes more profitable and will draw resources from the import-competing 
sector. Finally the labour-supply effect occurs through the release of domestic labour, which 
is freed by moving labour abroad. This effect is also likely to depress low-skill wages.  
 
Meanwhile the decrease in the costs of offshoring affects high-skilled labour and other factor 
inputs as well. Offshoring of low-skill tasks has no productivity effect for other factor inputs, 
since it has no direct effect on the wage bill of these other factors. However, the relative-
price effect and the labour-supply effect do have such a direct effect. The relative-price 
effect, causing an increase in the terms of trade, boosts the high-skill intensive exporting 
industry and hence the return on high-skilled labour. The labour-supply effect drives down 
relative prices of low-skilled labour, which is equivalent to an increase in the relative price of 
high-skilled labour. All in all, the conclusion from this model is that a decrease in the costs of 
offshoring can affect the returns on low- and high-skilled labour in different ways. When, for 
low-skilled labour, the positive productivity effect outweighs the negative relative-price and 
labour-supply effects, low-skilled labour will benefit. Otherwise the return on low-skilled 
labour decreases. The return on high-skilled labour will increase in all cases, since both the 
relative-price effect and the labour-supply effect are positive. So form the perspective of 
distribution the important issue is whether positive effects for low-skilled labour outweigh 
the adverse effects. This appears to be different for a small Heckscher-Ohlin economy and 
for a large Heckscher-Ohlin economy. In the first case domestic low-skilled labour benefits 
from the increased offshoring and domestic high-skilled labour and other factors are 
unaffected. In the case of a large economy like for instance the United States, which can 
influence on world prices, the situation is different.. The question is whether the productivity 
effect outweighs the relative-price effect. This depends, for example, on the elasticity of 
demand of traded goods, which determines the relative strength of price-movements. The 
conclusion is that it equally possible for low-skilled labour to benefit than it is to loose out 
from the reduction in the costs of offshoring. As before, the return on high-skilled labour is 
only affected by the relative-price effect and hence benefits from reducing the costs of 
offshoring. These effects do not differ very much when the model allows for other tasks next 
to low-skill tasks to become tradable as well.  
 
However, the effect that domestic factors can gain from offshoring tasks could also be 
predicted by Ricardian determinants like comparative advantages. So the question is whether 
the trade in tasks model really makes a difference in explaining trade flows. Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicaud (2006) argue that it does. The special feature of the trade in tasks model is 
that when certain tasks are moved abroad, this is done in all industries. For example, when 
low-skill tasks  are moved abroad, this is done both in the industry which is intensive in low-
skilled labour and in the industry which is intensive in high-skilled labour. Therefore trade in 
tasks will even occur when there are no differences in relative endowments. This kind of 
trade is not explained by the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework. The trade in tasks 
model thus successfully links trade and transaction costs to Trefler’s (1995) ‘missing trade 
puzzle’ (Baldwin and Robert-Nicaud, 2006). That is why this model provides a theoretical 
argument of our empirical analysis in section 4. of the relationship between productivity and 
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various types of off shoring for a trading country, such as the Netherlands. First the next 
section discusses some empirical studies of others with respect to offshoring and productivity 
gains. 
 
3. Review of the empirical literature 
 
3.1 Gains from offshoring? 
We first discuss studies that focus on the gains from offshoring. The McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI; 2003, 2005) estimates that for every dollar spent on offshoring, the American 
economy would gain an additional $1.12 till $1.14. These gains are propagate as lower 
consumer prices and higher producer profits. The MGI study shows that the gains of 
offshoring for France and Germany are considerably lower, i.e. an additional $0.74 and $0.86 
respectively. MGI finds that the benefits of offshoring are largely dependent on labour 
market flexibility, i.e. the strength of the labour market to adjust, and on cultural and 
linguistic factors. For example, English as their first language makes easier for American 
firms to move abroad than for French and German firms. These cultural and linguistic factors 
are of course again linked to the concept of transaction costs. In their study for the United 
States Amiti and Wei (2004) estimate the effects on labour productivity of manufacturing and 
services separately. They find no significant effect of offshoring of manufacturing. They do 
however find a positive significant effect of moving services abroad. An increase in service-
offshoring by 1 percentage point increases labour productivity by 0.43 to 0.57 percentage 
points. In a follow-up Amiti and Wei (2006) address possible endogeneity issues of the 
explanatory variables. In this more sophisticated analysis they now find a significant positive 
effect of offshoring of manufacturing on labour productivity as well. 
 
From an extensive literature review of the effects of outsourcing and offshoring on 
productivity levels,. Bjerren Olsen (2006) concludes that no plain general result emerges 
from the literature. There are however some indicative conclusions. First it seems that the 
benefits of offshoring are subject to diminishing returns. Some studies point out that the 
productivity gains from offshoring manufacturing are actually quite small while the gains 
from offshoring services are large. This might be the case because the offshoring of services 
is a relatively new phenomenon compared to the offshoring of manufacturing. Offshoring of 
manufacturing may have reached its point of diminishing returns where additional 
investments are no longer profitable, while the benefits from service-offshoring are just being 
reaped. Bjerren Olsen also finds that the gains from service-offshoring are larger when a 
company is already active internationally.  
 
3.2 Losses from offshoring? 
The anti-globalization sentiment is that through the reduction in transaction costs and the 
opening up of labour-abundant BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) not only 
low-skill jobs will move abroad, but in the long run also more high-skill jobs. Indeed, 
recently specific services, such as call centres, accounting services, but also high-tech 
production facilities such as computer software facilities have moved abroad, e.g. to India. It 
is feared that Western countries loose their comparative advantages to these high-pace 
developing countries. A study by Naghavi and Ottaviano (2004) challenges the notion of the 
previous sections that offshoring is an all-win game. They formulate a model in which 
offshoring might damage domestic economic growth, because offshoring can reduce 
innovation and hence technological progress. For example when firms decide to move part of 
their production process to low-wage countries, they usually only move production facilities 
which can benefit from the lower wages, but not research and development (R&D) facilities, 
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which need the technologically advanced labour in the domestic country. This gives rise to 
reduced feed-back from production facilities to R&D facilities due to geographical distance. 
Also it is often assumed that increased competition stimulates innovation by firms. When 
firms move abroad to compete in costs, incentives to innovate may deteriorate, reducing 
overall economic growth domestically (Naghavi and Ottaviano, 2004). 
 
Apart from this possible negative effect of offshoring on R&D, the theoretical model of the 
previous section suggests that two other negative effects may occur, namely the relative-price 
effect and the labour-supply effect. When these effects are large they may outweigh the 
positive productivity effect. Bhagwahti et al (2004) put the relative-price effect in a historical 
perspective. They argue that a similar anti-globalization sentiment as today’s existed in 
Europe in the 1950s when the American economy was rapidly expanding and in the United 
States in the 1970s when the Japanese economy was growing at a fast pace. Bhagwati et al 
conclude, however, that the relative-price effect has been relatively small in these situations 
and is unlikely to outweigh other beneficial effects. The public discussion on offshoring 
mostly focuses on the labour-supply effect. The argument is that when labour is moved 
abroad, unemployment will rise, since there are fewer jobs to be filled domestically. Some 
authors (see e.g. Biermans and Van Leeuwen, 2006) argue that this contention is an example 
of the so-called ‘lump of labour fallacy’, i.e. the presumption that in an economy only a 
limited and fixed amount of work needs to be done. This presumption is considered a fallacy 
by most economists, who argue that the amount of work is not static but adapts to demand. In 
the case of offshoring, when production jobs are moved abroad, there may be an increase in 
the number of jobs of those who coordinate production abroad.. Moreover, whereas domestic 
firms are moving jobs abroad, foreign firms will move jobs to the home-country. In this 
perspective Biermans and van Leeuwen (2006) find that jobs being moved to the Netherlands 
are mostly jobs in manufacturing.  
 
In his study of the effects of offshoring on the Dutch labour market for the period 1996-2003. 
Vroom (2007) shows that the number of low-skill jobs was not affected adversely by 
offshoring during the whole sample period. However, the demand for high-skilled labour was 
affected adversely by offshoring during recession (2000-2003). During the economic boom 
in the sample period (1996-2000) and on average over the whole sample period the demand 
for high-skilled labour was also unaffected by offshoring. Domestic factor mobility 
determines the size of the labour-supply effect. With high labour mobility the negative 
labour-supply effect will be small. Labour market rigidities also bring about that short run 
effects of offshoring on the domestic economy are less favourable than long run effects 
(Bjerring Olsen, 2006).Egger and Egger (2001) find that offshoring leads to a decrease in 
labour productivity among low-skilled workers of 0.18% in the short run, but in the long run 
offshoring yielded a 0.53% increase in low-skill labour productivity. All in all some evidence 
suggests that the losses from offshoring may outweigh the benefits, at least in the short run. 
Whether this occurs is eventually an empirical question. The next section provides an answer 
to this question for the Netherlands. 
 
4. Empirical analysis for the Netherlands 
 
The model for trade in tasks in section 3 shows how reductions in the costs of offshoring can 
lead to productivity gains. This section tests this hypothesis by estimating the effects of 
offshoring on ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP) in the Netherlands. In our empirical 
framework TFP is that part of production growth, which can not be explained by the changes 
in capital or labour inputs. Productivity gains through offshoring is regarded as a possible 
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determinant of that residual.† Figure.1 pictures the development of total factor productivity 
from 1979 until 2001. The overall trend appears to be upward, although the trend seems to 
reverse in the last two years of the reference period. Verbruggen (2001) argues that this 
downturn in TFP-growth is for the most part due to ‘labour hoarding’ in the economic 
recession of those years, i.e. employers did not lay off labour capacity because it was too 
expensive to make workers redundant and hire them again in the upsurge after the recession.. 
 
Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity in the Netherlands, 1979-2001 
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Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2007 
 
4.1 The model 
In order to assess the effects of offshoring on TFP we estimate a production function for the 
Netherlands using yearly data from the observation period1972 - 2001. This production 
function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas functional form and given by 
 
( )tttt LKFAY ,=
      (1) 
21 ββ
tttt LKAY =
       (2) 
 
where Y is output, K is capital input, L is labour input and finally A is the technology 
component or TFP. The subscript t  refers to time and all variables, including A are allowed 
to vary through time in our model specification. For practical convenience we will drop the 
time subscript for the time being, and reintroduce it later, when we are going to estimate the 
model. The coefficients β1  and  β2 represent production technology and jointly determine the 
returns to scale of both factors. function has the nice feature When β1  and  β2  add up to one, 
the Cobb-Douglas production function exhibits constant returns, which is an assumption of 
the theoretical model in section 3. When the coefficients add up to more than one, the 
production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. When on the other hand they add up 
to less than one, we have decreasing returns to scale. Using this feature we can thus also 
easily check our assumption on returns to scale in the economy. 
 
Taking the natural log of both sides of the production function yields the following 
expression. 
 
                                               
†
 Usually economists assume that the main driver behind growth in TFP is technological growth, see e.g. Romer 
(2005). 
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1 2y a k lβ β= + +
     (3) 
 
In equation (3 )lowercase letters denote the natural log of there capital counterparts, so e.g. 
 y = log Y . In our specification we will let offshoring influence production through the 
technology factor, or: 
 
3 4ˆ z  
m sa a x xβ β δ= + + +
           (4) 
 
In this expression xm and  xs are a measure of international vertical integration of the 
production process in manufacturing and services respectively. Finally we include z as a list 
of control variables, with δ as the vector containing their respective coefficients. We estimate 
a number of alternative model specifications including additional control variables in order to 
improve the model and counter omitted variable bias. Substituting the expression for TFP in 
our production function yields the following log-linear regression equation to be estimated. 
 
1 2 3 4ˆ z
m sy a k l x xβ β β β δ ε= + + + + + +
  (5) 
 
In expression (5) ε is included to denote the error term. The coefficients of this expression are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). It assumes  that none of the independent 
variables is correlated with the error term. If this assumption does not hold, we need to find 
appropriate instruments and use Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation. The estimated 
coefficients β3  and  β4  influence a, representing TFP. A positive value on the offshoring 
coefficients implies, that offshoring leads to an increase in TFP.  
 
4.2 The data 
In order to estimate expression (5) we use data from the EU KLEMS Database, March 2007. 
These include data on gross domestic product (Y), capital input (K) and labour input (L) over 
the observation period 1972-2001.‡ We have adjusted this data for inflation by using the GDP 
price deflator (base year 1990) also included in the EU KLEMS Database. 
 
In order to include the effects of offshoring in our model we need an appropriate measure for 
this phenomenon. For that reason we adapt the measure of vertical specialization of a 
country’s production process in the international economy, used by Hummels et al (1999). 
This measure, which they label VS, measures the value of imported inputs embodied in goods 
that are exported, i.e. the foreign value added embodied in exports. This measure for each 
industry i reads as: 
 
i
i
i exports
output gross
inputs imported
⋅





=iVS
    (6) 
 
To obtain a VS  measure for the country as a whole, Hummels et al sum over all industries 
and normalize by total exports. The latter is done in order to study the composition of trade. 
Aggregate VS increases when imported inputs increase or when exports increase in the 
sectors which utilize imported inputs relatively intensively. Our measure of vertical 
specialization used in the regression analysis, and which we will calculate for both 
manufacturing (m) and services (s), now becomes: 
                                               
‡
 The data can be downloaded free from http://www.euklems.net.  
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,  with   all industries belonging to sector h
                           and  ,   
hj
jh
hj
j
VS
VS j
X
h m s
= =
=
∑
∑
(7) 
 
For the computation of these measure of vertical specialization we use input-output tables 
from Eurostat and the OECD over the years 1972-2001.§. In matrix notation, the following 
expression is calculated. 
 
/h hVS X=
MuA X
      (8) 
  
In expression (8) the vector u refers to a 1xn vector of 1’s. X is an nx1 vector of exports and 
Xh is total number of exports. The matrix  AM is an nxn matrix in which element aij refers to 
the number of imported inputs M from industry i to produce one unit of output in industry j, 
i.e. jiij YMa = . 
 
Table 2 shows the calculated indicators for vertical specialization for a number of years. In 
order to compare the results for the Netherlands with those of  a number of large OECD 
economies we have also computed the indicators for Germany, the United States and Japan. 
 
Table 2: Vertical Specialization in four OECD Countries 
 
Vertical Specialization Index: Eurostat and OECD Database, Results 
 Netherlands Germany United States Japan 
Year Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
1970s* 0.2996 0.0000 ** ** 0.0337 0.0000 0.1301 0.0002
1980s* 0.3991 0.0000 0.1315 0.0043 0.0510 0.0000 0.1503 0.0009
1990 0.3515 0.0093 0.1823 0.0052 0.0738 0.0000 0.1186 0.0007
2000 0.4397 0.0162 0.2688 0.0080 0.1205 0.0008 ** **
 
*   The indices for the Netherlands, United States and Japan do not cover the whole decades 
as some data were not available.  
** No data available to calculate these values. 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat Input-Output Database following Hummels et al (1999)  
 
The results from table 2 illustrate that the Netherlands is, of all countries considered, by far 
most vertically integrated with the rest of the world. This confirms the fact that the 
Netherlands, as a medium sized economy, is characterized by its large degree of openness to 
trade with the rest of the world. The table also shows that for all countries but Japan, the 
degree of vertical specialization is increasing and even accelerating, both in manufacturing 
and in services. Japan is characterized by a relative stable degree of vertical specialization. 
Vertical specialization in services has historically been very low. It seems that there has been 
almost no scope for offshoring in services until the 1990s. A scope for future research is to 
see whether the ICT-revolution in the beginning of the 21st century has enhanced the degree 
                                               
§
 The data can be accessed for free at the website of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org, and the website of 
Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.  
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of vertical specialization in services, since the increased utilization of Internet and other more 
advanced communication techniques seems likely to have reduced transaction costs so that 
the offshoring of services has become more and more profitable. Figure 2 illustrates s the 
overall development of vertical specialization and offshoring in the Netherlands. We note 
that in constructing the yearly data we have used weighted averages to fill in missing data. 
That is because the database from the OECD does not contain input-output tables for all the 
relevant years.. 
. 
Figure 2: Vertical Specialization in the Netherlands – Offshoring Manufacturing and 
Services 
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These data are used to estimate a number of alternatives for specification (5). This 
specification also includes some control variables z. First of all we will include the usual 
determinant of growth in TFP, i.e. expenditure on research and development (R&D). R&D 
expenditure is often used as a proxy for innovation, and therefore as a determinant which 
endogenizes technological progress. For that reason, the Lisbon strategy of 2000 which 
purports to make the EU “the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world” by 2010” focuses on knowledge and research and development. One 
of the criteria of the Lisbon Strategy is that 3% of the GDP is invested in R&D. For our 
estimates we use data on R&D from the OECD R&D Expenditure Database, Volume 2006. 
Since R&D can have a long lasting effect on income it should be included as a stock variable. 
We specify the stock of R&D by aggregating R&D expenditure which depreciates 20 percent 
each year. 
 
In one of our alternative specifications we let the parameter â be time-dependent, in order to 
allow for changes in the exogenous (and unexplained) part of technological progress through 
time. For that reason we split up our observation period of 30 years into three subperiods of 
10 years by including two dummy variables for the years 1982-1991 and 1992-2001, which 
make the period 1972-1981 our base years. 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
Table 3 gives the estimation results of four variants of specification (5) where total output 
acts as dependent variable. Alternative 1 is a simple Cobb Douglas production function 
without any explanatory variables for TFP. In this alternative both the coefficients of labour 
and capital are positive and (highly) significant. In alternative 2 both indicators of vertical 
specialization are added to alternative 1. Here the indicator for offshoring of manufacturing 
obtains a highly significant coefficient with the expected positive sign. It implies that in the 
observation period vertical outsourcing of manufacturing contributed considerably to 
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production and has therefore enhanced productivity. However, offshoring of services does 
not contribute much to productivity: the sign of its coefficient is positive indeed, but the 
effects not at all significant. It is interesting to note that in alternative 1 returns to scale (the 
sum of the coefficients of  capital and labour input) is somewhat larger than one, suggesting 
some increasing returns to scale. In alternative 2 (and all other alternatives of the table) the 
returns to scale are closer to 1, suggesting constant returns to scale, which is more in line 
with our theoretical assumptions of  section 3. This outcome can also be seen as a hint that by 
omitting determinants which endogenise part of the technological progress, returns to scale 
are overestimated. In alternative 3 we have included the stock of R&D as additional 
explanatory variable. This control variable does not bring about an improvement of our 
model; on the contrary: the coefficients of both offshoring manufacturing and of R&D are 
positive as expected, but standard errors are high so that the effects are not significant. 
Moreover, the coefficient value of labour is rather high and of capital rather low in this 
regression. The low coefficient value of the stock of R&D in alternative 3 suggests that R&D 
has contributed less to productivity growth in the Netherlands than offshoring. This is in 
conformity with the hypothesis that the Netherlands, as an open economy and an trading 
nation, has benefited much from the possibilities of globalization to reduce transaction costs 
and to offshore parts of the production chain. These innovations in trade may have been at 
least as important for productivity growth than innovations stemming from investments in 
R&D. A caveat here is that innovations through R&D and the possibilities to offshore 
manufacturing may be much related, which would explain that the coefficient become 
insignificant when both determinants are included as explanatory variables. 
 
Finally, the results for alternative 4 show that de dummy variables for the subperiods do not 
obtain significant coefficient values, so that there seem to be no systematic changes in  the 
exogenous part of TFP during the observation period.       
 
 15
Table 3: Estimation Results for four alternatives of Specification (5) – Ordinary Least 
Squares 
 
Production Function Estimation, Results 
Dependent Variable: Output  1 2 4 5ˆ z
m sy a k l x xβ β β β δ ε= + + + + + +
 
 
Explanatory Variables Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Alternative 4 
  Residual TFP ( aˆ ”) 0.8307*** 
(0.0779) 
1.2129*** 
(0.0860) 
0.6817** 
(0.2606) 
1.2390*** 
(0.0895) 
  Capital ( 1β ) 
    Natural log 
0.2046*** 
(0.0288) 
0.3539*** 
(0.0322) 
0.1800*** 
(0.0461) 
0.3571*** 
(0.0386) 
  Labour ( 2β ) 
    Natural log 
0.8329*** 
(0.0332) 
0.6475*** 
(0.0391) 
0.8377*** 
(0.0654) 
0.6430*** 
(0.0434) 
  Offshoring Manufacturing 
( 3β ) 
 0.4165*** 
(0.0720) 
0.1424 
(0.0904) 
0.3913*** 
(0.0818) 
  Offshoring Services ( 4β )  0.1003 (0.1467) 
-0.1259 
(0.1527) 
-0.0324 
(0.1854) 
Control Variables     
  Research and Development 
( 1δ ) 
    Natural log 
  0.0214 
(0.0478) 
 
  Dummy Variable 1982-1991 
( 2δ ) 
   0.0000 
(0.0094) 
  Dummy Variable 1992-2001 
( 3δ ) 
   0.0063 
(0.0102) 
 
    
  Returns to scale ( 1β + 2β ) 1.0353 1.0014 1.0177 1.0001 
 
Standard errors in parentheses:* Significant at the 10  percent level;** Significant at the 
5  percent level;*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
The previous analysis looks at the influence of offshoring manufacturing and services on 
total output. However, it is conceivable that offshoring manufacturing mainly affects output 
of the manufacturing sector, and offshoring services mainly the output of the service sector. 
Therefore we have also estimated a model specification using sectoral data inputs. The 
estimated regression equation for this specification is: 
 
1 2 4ˆ    with   ,  
h
h h h h h h hy a k l x h m sβ β β ε= + + + + =
   (9) 
 
The estimation results for both manufacturing and services are shown in table 4,.  
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Table 4: Estimation results for manufacturing and services sectors separately – Ordinary 
Least Squares 
 
Production Function Estimation, Sectoral Level, Results 
Dependent variable: sectoral output  1 2 4ˆ    with   ,  
h
h h h h h h hy a k l x h m sβ β β ε= + + + + =
 
Explanatory Variables Manufacturing Services 
  Residual TFP ( aˆ ”) 0.8551*** 
(0.0705) 
0.5888*** 
(0.1405) 
  Capital ( 1β ) 
    Natural log 
0.2825*** 
(0.0331) 
0.2763*** 
(0.0442) 
  Labour ( 2β ) 
    Natural log 
0.7853*** 
(0.0394) 
0.7668*** 
(0.0520) 
  Offshoring Manufacturing 
( 3β ) 
0.3340*** 
(0.0929) 
 
  Offshoring Services ( 4β )  0.7208* (0.4157) 
 
    
  Returns to scale ( 1β + 2β ) 1.0678 1.0431 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: * Significant at the 10  percent level;** Significant at 
the 5  percent level; *** Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
 
The results in table 4 on output of the manufacturing sector are quite similar to the results of 
alternative 2 in table 3 for total output. The coefficient of offshoring manufacturing obtains a 
positive sign and is again highly significant. The result of interest of table 4 is that for the 
output of the service sector. Here offshoring services obtains a positive sign and is rather 
high albeit only significant at the 10% level. As offshoring services is a rather recent 
phenomenon it seems plausible that its effect on productivity does not show up in the 
regression equation for total output. Now that a positive contribution shows up in explaining 
output of the service sector, it may indicate that offshoring services will, in the future, be an 
important source for productivity increases. A puzzling aspect of the regression outcomes of 
table 4 is that in both alternatives the returns to scale are rather high as compared with the 
outcomes of table 3. 
  
4.4  Discussion 
The regression results of tables 3 and 4 are bound to some caveats which open up a scope for 
future research  We already mentioned the interaction between investments in R&D and 
offshoring. This is related to the possibility of endogeneity of our explanatory variables on 
offshoring. The use of OLS assumes that our regressors are exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with 
the error term. However, offshoring may be endogenous in our model. In such cases 
instrumental variables should be used in order to avoid simultaneity bias. Endogeneity may 
be the result of unobserved effects, which are correlated with both productivity and 
offshoring (Bjerring Olsen, 2006). A reason may be that high-skilled labour intensive firms 
are more likely to move low-skilled labour offshore, and focus on their core competences, 
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than firms with less labour skill diversity. A related problem is that of reverse causality. 
Offshoring may not be productivity increasing per se, but more productive firms may engage 
in offshoring more quickly. In this situation, productivity is in first instance increased by 
other determinants than offshoring. In order to deal with such simultaneity Amiti and Wei 
(2006) use a measure of the utilization of Internet and digital phones as an instrument for 
offshoring. A reason for selecting these instruments is the finding of Freund and Weinhold 
(2002) that internet penetration has a significant influence on the trade in services between 
countries. 
 
Another suggestion for future research is to construct a panel dataset, by including more 
countries to our time-series. However, presently such dataset is difficult to construct as the 
OECD database does not contain input-output tables for consecutive years for many 
countries. These input-output tables are only available for different years for different 
countries so that it is difficult to construct consistent time series data for our measure of 
vertical specialization VS. When more consistent and recent data become available, it would 
be especially interesting to focus on the effects on productivity of offshoring  services. Since 
there has been an ongoing improvement in the utilization of information- and communication 
technology, it seems likely that service-offshoring has increased in recent years.  
 
All in all we acknowledge that our empirical analysis only provides a first indication of the 
importance of the effects of offshoring on productivity. Our conclusion so far is that 
offshoring has possibly enhanced productivity in 1972-2001, which raises hope for future 
offshoring opportunities and might temper anti-globalization sentiments. 
  
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows that transaction costs play a major role in the ongoing fragmentation of 
production and specialization which is a key feature of globalization. Such specialization 
brings about offshoring and outsourcing of tasks which are to be executed at those locations 
in the world where costs are lowest. If transaction costs are sufficiently low, offshoring will 
enhance productivity and therefore be welfare increasing. Our empirical time series analysis 
for the Netherlands, using indicators for vertical specialization, suggests that indeed such 
positive effects on productivity occur. These innovations in trade and in organizing 
production along with keeping transaction costs low, are at least as important for productivity 
growth in the Netherlands as innovations which stem from investments in R&D. Of course 
both types of innovations are much interconnected. A further investigation of the spill-overs 
between these different forms of innovations provides a scope for future research. Another 
subject for future research is to see whether the productivity increases through the reduction 
of transaction costs and the exploitation of possibilities for offshoring and specialization are 
of specific interest to a trading nation with an open economy such as the Netherlands. The 
suggestion is that such trading nations have comparative advantages in orchestrating 
production and in trade in tasks. It would imply extending our empirical analysis to other 
countries as well. The analysis could also be extended by estimating the effects of vertical 
specialization for more sectors of industry, or even by using micro data at the firm level 
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